[490] In the circumstances, which include my conclusion that there is no evidence Dr. Weir was motivated in her communications with or conduct towards the plaintiff by religious bias, which was the foundation of the plaintiff’s grade appeal, finding bad faith or negligence or foreseeable harm in a process which came to essentially the same conclusion is problematic.
[491] I conclude there is no evidence upon which a properly instructed jury acting reasonably could find liability against UBC arising from its representatives’ conduct of the appeal process.
[492] This is a case which in the final analysis fails because it relies on speculation, innuendo and conjecture, rather than inferences based on the evidence, of the respective states of mind of the various defendants necessary to establish liability; in the case of the CRPA, the intention to interfere with the plaintiff’s civil rights by promoting hatred, contempt or her inferiority in comparison to others based on her religion; in the case of bad faith negligence, malice or ill will arising out of religious bias, or otherwise.
[493] The law must be restrained in intervening in the conduct of affairs in any circumstances where what are at issue are expressions and communications made in the context of an exploration of ideas, no matter how controversial or provocative those ideas may be. It is for that reason that the CRPA requires evidence that an alleged tortfeasor not only engaged in communications which had the effect of an interference with a person’s civil rights by inciting religious based hatred or contempt of her or by inciting a sense of her inferiority, but also that the tortfeasor intended that result. It is also for that reason that, in the specific context of the academic exploration of ideas, the University Act prevents actions against the defendant UBC or its representatives unless there is evidence of bad faith.
[494] Those evidentiary thresholds, while not depriving those subjected to harm of the right to a remedy for malicious or morally oblique behaviour, are nevertheless necessary to further academic freedom, which is vital to the function of a university and the community it serves, and freedom of expression, which is crucial to the operation of a free and democratic society.
[495] In this case, the asserted foundation for the court’s intervention in the conduct of the university’s academic affairs lacks any evidence of these essential elements of the torts alleged under the CRPA and of negligence as pleaded against any of the defendants. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim is dismissed with costs to the defendants.